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Best Managment Practicies Against Piracy

ΤΟΥ ΣΠΟΥΔΑΣΤΗ: ΜΗΤΣΙΟΥ ΔΗΜΗΤΡΙΟΥ ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΗ

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Πίνακας Περιεχομένων

SECTION 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of this Dissertation

The purpose of this dissertation is to find Best Managment Practicies Against Piracy

ΣΥΝΤΟΜΗ ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ

In this dissertaton we will refer to the best managment practicies against piracy.At the Section i will make a short review at the history of piracy from the ancient times untill today. At the section 3 i will refer to the Somali based piracy activity and the high risk area. In section 4 I will continue with the risk assesment and the ship Vulnerable Points. Furthermore in section 5 i will point out the company and ship Masters planning and Ship Protection measures. In section 6 i will explain the Approach and Attack stage of a piracy attack and what the crew should do in the event of a military Action. Finaly in the section 7 i will the Piracy definitions and statistics.

SECTION 2

History of Piracy

The first recorded incidence of piracy dates back to as early as the 14th century bc when Sea Peoples threatened the Aegean and Mediterranean voyages. In Classical Antiquity (starting in 8th century BC), the Illyrians, Tyrrhenians, Greeks, Romans, as well as the Phoenicians had been involved in acts of piracies. In the 3rd century BC, Illyrians were most popular pirates who were constantly raiding the Adriatic Sea, and thus conflicting with the mighty Roman Republic. Their threat was finally crushed after the Romans conquered Illyria in 168 BC.

During the 1st century BC, pirates set up a large nation in Cilicia (now in Turkey) along the Anatolian Coast, threatening the trade of the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean. The great Roman emperor Julius Caesar is said to be captured by Cilician pirates on a voyage across the Aegean Sea in 75 BC. He was released only after the payment of huge ransom amounting to fifty talents of gold. It's said that after his release, he raised a fleet, captured the pirates and put them to death.

During the period of 258-264 AD, the Gothic pirates looted the towns along the Black Sea coast and Aegean coast, and reached to Cyprus and Crete. In 286 AD, Romans appointed a military commander to eliminate the Frankish and Saxon pirates. The Irish pirates captured and enslaved the famous Irish saint St. Patrick around 450 AD.

Middle Ages to 19th Century

Vikings, which translates to sea raiders, were the most popular pirates during the medieval age. Considered as very brave and strong pirates, **Vikings** were active in a wide area from Western Europe to Eastern Europe to coasts of North Africa. They were mainly active during **8th to 12th century AD**. Moor pirates were also active in this period along the Mediterranean coast. The Novgorodian pirates looted the cities on the Volga and Kama Rivers in the 14th century AD.

Middle Ages to 19th Century

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Other famous pirates during the middle ages were the Arab pirates, privateers, and the Barbary corsairs. They later sailed to the West Indies and became members of buccaneers pirates who looted ships along the Caribbean Sea. Buccaneers are considered the most powerful pirates who flourished during the golden period of piracy between 1620 and 1720.

In the early **19th century**, the **Chinese pirates** emerged on the scene. They were active in the waters of Straight of Malacca, the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia. Their threat was eliminated by the joint forces of the US Navy and Royal Navy during 1860-70 AD.

Piracy in recent times

The problem of piracy didn't end with the demise of the golden age of piracy. It existed in one form or another somewhere in the world. But it grew rapidly during the last decade of the 20th century, and became a major problem for international commerce in the first decade of the 21st century. Today, there are several hot spots for modern piracy including the Gulf of Aden, off the Somali and Nigerian coasts, Strait of Malacca, and the Indian Ocean.

Modern pirates 1

SECTION 3

3.1 Somali based pirate attacks

The presence of Naval/Military forces in the Gulf of Aden, concentrated on the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), has significantly reduced the incidence of piracy attack in this area. With Naval/Military forces concentrated in this area, Somali pirate activity has been forced out into the Arabian Sea and beyond. It is important to note, however, that there remains a serious and continuing threat from piracy in the Gulf of Aden

Somali based pirate attacks have taken place throughout the Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea and Northern Indian Ocean, affecting all shipping in the region. The recent increasing use of hijacked merchant ships, fishing vessels and dhows as 'Motherships' enables pirates to operate at extreme range from Somalia, carrying attack craft (skiffs) and weapons

3.2 Pirate activity

The level of pirate activity varies within the High Risk Area due to changing weather conditions and activity by Naval/ Military forces.

Pirate activity generally reduces in areas affected by the South West monsoon, and increases in the period following the monsoon. The onset of the North East monsoon generally has a lesser effect on piracy activity than the South West monsoon. When piracy activity is reduced in one area of the High Risk Area it is likely to increase in another area (eg the area off Kenya and Tanzania, the Gulf of Aden and Bab al-

Mandeb all generally experience an increase in pirate activity during the South West monsoon)

3.3 Maran Centaurus incident

The MT Maran Centaurus was hijacked on 30/11/2009. The Greek-flagged Maran Centaurus was hijacked on Sunday about 800 miles off the coast of Somalia.The ship had left Jeddah en route for the US, has 28 crew members on board. The crew is understood to comprise 16 Filipinos, nine Greeks, two Ukrainians and one Romanian. Finaly after 20 days under pirate command the MT Maran Centaurus was released.

Pirate weapons 1

Crew living conditions under Piracy 1

Section 4

4.1 Risk Assessment

Prior to transiting the High Risk Area, ship operators and Masters should carry out a thorough Risk Assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, based on the latest available information (see Annex A for useful contacts, including MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre, UKMTO and MARLO). The output of this Risk Assessment should identify measures for prevention, mitigation and recovery, which will mean combining statutory regulations with supplementary measures to combat piracy. It is important that the Risk Assessment is ship and voyage specific, and not generic. Factors to be considered in the Risk Assessment should include, but may not be limited to, the following: Crew Safety: The primary consideration should be to ensure the safety of the crew. Care should be taken, when formulating measures to prevent illegal boarding and external access to the accommodation, that crew members will not be trapped inside and should be able to escape in the event of another type of emergency, such as, for example fire. Careful consideration should be given to the location of a Safe Muster Point or Citadel. Consideration should also be given to the ballistic protection afforded to the crew who may be required to remain on the bridge during a pirate attack, recognising that pirates increasingly fire at the bridge of a vessel to try to force it to stop.

4.2 Ships Vulnerable Points

It is likely that pirates will try to board the ship being attacked at the lowest point above the waterline, making it easier for them to climb onboard. These points are often on either quarter or at the vessel's stern.Experience suggests that vessels with a minimum freeboard that is greater than 8 metres have a much greater chance of successfully escaping a piracy attempt than those with less. A large freeboard will provide little or no protection if the construction of the ship provides access to pirates seeking to climb onboard, and thus further protective measures should be considered. A large freeboard alone may not be enough to deter a pirate attack

4.3 Speed and Sea State

Speed

One of the most effective ways to defeat a pirate attack is by using speed to try to outrun the attackers and/or make it difficult to board. To date, there have been no reported attacks where pirates have boarded a ship that has been proceeding at over 18 knots. It is possible however that pirate tactics and techniques may develop to enable them to board faster moving ships.Ships are recommended to proceed at Full Sea Speed, or at least 18 knots where they are capable of greater speed, throughout their transit of the High Risk Area. It is very important to increase to maximum safe speed immediately after identifying any suspicious vessel and as quickly as possible in order to try to open the CPA (Closest Point of Approach) from any possible attackers and/or make the vessel more difficult to board. If a vessel is part of a 'Group Transit' within the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC), speed may be required to be adjusted. It is recommended that reference should be made to the MSCHOA, NATO Shipping Centre and MARLO websites for the latest threat guidance regarding pirate attack speed capability

Sea State

Pirates mount their attacks from very small craft (skiffs), even where they are supported by larger vessels or 'Motherships', which tends to limit their operations to moderate sea states. It is likely to be more difficult to operate small craft effectively in sea state 3 and above.

SECTION 5

5.1 Company Planning

Company Planning - Prior to entering the High Risk Area

1) Register ship with MSCHOA website.It is strongly recommended that ship operators register for access to the restricted sections of the MSCHOA website (www.MSCHOA.org) prior to entering the High Risk Area as it contains additional and updated information. Note that this is not the same as registering a ship's movement - see below

2) Obtain the latest information from the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre websites. Great care should be taken in voyage planning in the High Risk Area given that pirate attacks are taking place at extreme range from the Somali Coast. It is important to obtain the latest information from the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre websites (www.MSCHOA.org and www.shipping.NATO.int) before planning and executing a voyage.

3) Review the SSA and SSP Review the Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and implementation of the Ship Security Plan (SSP), as required by the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS), to counter the piracy threat.

4) Put SSP in place The Company Security Officer (CSO) is encouraged to ensure that a SSP is in place for a passage through the High Risk Area, and that this is exercised, briefed and discussed with the Master and the Ship Security Officer (SSO).

5) Monitor piracy related websites on specific threats Ensure that ships are aware of any specific threats within the High Risk Areas that have been promulgated on the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre websites – www.mschoa. org and

www.shipping.NATO.int. Additionally all NAV WARNINGS – Sat C (NAVTEXT in limited areas) should be monitored and acted upon as appropriate by the ship's Master

6)Offer guidance to Master with regard to the recommended route Offer the ship's Master guidance with regard to the recommended routeing through the High Risk Area and details of the piracy threat. Guidance should be provided on the available methods of transiting the IRTC, (eg a Group Transit or National Convoys where these exist). Group Transits coordinated by MSCHOA within the IRTC, group vessels together by speed for maximum protection. Further details of Group Transit schemes including departure timings can be found on the MSCHOA website. National Convoys. A number of Naval/Military forces offer protected convoys through the IRTC. Details of the convoy schedules may be found on the MSCHOA website.

7) Plan and install Ship Protection Measures The provision of carefully planned and installed Ship Protection Measures prior to transiting the High Risk Area is very strongly recommended. Suggested Ship Protection Measures are set out within this booklet – see section 8. It has been proven that the use of Ship Protection Measures significantly increases the prospects of a ship resisting a pirate attack

8) Conduct crew training sessions (including Citadel Drills where utilised) prior to transits and debriefing sessions post transits..

Company Planning - Upon entering the High Risk Area

Submit 'Vessel Movement Registration Form' to MSCHOA Ensure that a 'Vessel Movement Registration Form' has been submitted to MSCHOA. This may be done directly – online by the ship's operator, by fax, or by email. (See Annex E for details of the MSCHOA Vessel Movement Registration Form

5.2 Ship Master's Planning

Ship Master's Planning - Prior to entering the High Risk Area

1) Brief crew and conduct drill. Prior to entry into the High Risk Area it is recommended that the crew should be fully briefed on the preparations and a drill conducted. The plan should be reviewed and all personnel briefed on their duties, including familiarity with the alarm signifying a piracy attack, an all clear and the appropriate response to each. The drill should also consider the following: Testing the vessel's Ship Protection Measures, including testing of the security of all access points. The Ship Security Plan should be thoroughly reviewed.

2) Prepare an Emergency Communication Plan. Masters are advised to prepare an Emergency Communication Plan, to include all essential emergency contact numbers and prepared messages, which should be ready at hand or permanently displayed near all external communications stations

3) Define the ship's AIS policy. Although the Master has the discretion to switch off the AIS if he believes that its use increases the ship's vulnerability, in order to provide Naval/ Military forces with tracking information it is recommended that AIS is left on throughout the High Risk Area, but that it is restricted to ship's identity, position, course, speed, navigational status and safety-related information. The recommendation to keep the AIS on will be the subject of ongoing review - any updates will be notified on the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre websites

Transiting through the High Risk Area

1) Reduce maintenance and engineering work to minimum. Maintenance and engineering work in the High Risk Area – The following is recommended: Any work outside of the accommodation is strictly controlled and similarly access points limited and controlled. All Engine Room essential equipment is immediately available – no maintenance on essential equipment.

2) Daily submit 'Vessel Position Reporting Form - Daily Position Report' to UKMTO. Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily to the UKMTO by email at 08:00 hours GMT whilst operating within the High Risk Area. The UKMTO 'Vessel Position Reporting Form - Daily Position Report' should be used.

3) Carefully review all warnings and information. The Master (and Company) should appreciate that the voyage routeing may need to be reviewed in light of updated information received. This information and warnings may be provided by a number of different means including NAV WARNINGS – Sat C (and NAVTEXT in limited areas). It is important that all warnings and information are carefully reviewed

Prior to entering the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC)

1) Use IRTC 'Group Transit Scheme' while transiting through Gulf of Aden. It is strongly recommended that ships navigate within the IRTC, where Naval/Military forces are concentrated. Naval/Military forces operate the 'Group Transit Scheme' within the IRTC which is coordinated by MSCHOA. This scheme groups vessels together by speed for maximum protection for their transit through the IRTC. Further guidance on the 'Group Transit Scheme', including the departure timings for the different groups, is included on the MSCHOA website or can be obtained by fax from MSCHOA (see contact details at Annex A). Use of the 'Group Transit Scheme' is

recommended. Masters should note that warships might not be within visual range of the ships in the 'Group Transit Scheme', but this does not lessen the protection afforded by the scheme.

2)Make adjustments to passage plans to conform to MSCHOA advice.

3) National Convoys.Some countries offer independent convoy escorts through the IRTC where merchant vessels are escorted by a warship.

5.3 Ship Protection Measures

Watchkeeping and Enhanced Vigilance. Prior to entering the High Risk Area, it is recommended that preparations are made to support the requirement for increased vigilance by: Providing additional lookouts for each Watch. Additional lookouts should be fully briefed. Considering a shorter rotation of the Watch period in order to maximise alertness of the lookouts. Ensuring that there are sufficient binoculars for the enhanced Bridge Team, preferably anti glare. Considering use of night vision optics. Maintaining a careful Radar Watch. 24 Well constructed dummies placed at strategic locations around the vessel can give an impression of greater numbers of people on watch.

A proper lookout is the single most effective method of ship protection where early warning of a suspicious approach or attack is assured, and where defences can be readily deployed

Enhanced Bridge Protection

The bridge is usually the focus for any pirate attack. In the initial part of the attack, pirates direct weapons fire at the bridge to try to coerce the ship to stop. If they are able to board the vessel the pirates usually try to make for the bridge to enable them to take control. The following further protection enhancements might be considered: Kevlar jackets and helmets available for the bridge team to provide a level of protection for those on the bridge during an attack. (If possible, jackets and helmets should be in a non military colour). While most bridge windows are laminated, further protection against flying glass can be provided by the application of security glass film, often called Blast Resistant Film. Fabricated metal, (steel/aluminum), plates for the side and rear bridge windows and the bridge wing door windows, which may be rapidly secured in place in the event of an attack. The after part of both bridge wings, (often open), can be protected by a wall of sandbags. The sides and rear of the bridge,

and the bridge wings, may be protected with a double layer of chain link fence which has been shown to reduce the effect of an RPG round. Proprietary anti-RPG screens are also available.

Control of Access to Bridge, Accommodation and Machinery Spaces

It is very important to control access routes to deter or delay pirates who have managed to board a vessel and are trying to enter accommodation or machinery spaces. It is very important to recognise that if pirates do gain access to the upper deck of a vessel they will be tenacious in their efforts to gain access to the accommodation section and in particular the bridge. It is strongly recommended that significant effort is expended prior to entry to the High Risk Area to deny the pirates access to the accommodation and the bridge

All doors and hatches providing access to the bridge, accommodation and machinery spaces should be properly secured to prevent them being opened by pirates.

Where doors and hatches are required to be closed for watertight integrity, ensure all clips are fully dogged down in addition to any locks. Where possible, additional securing such as with wire strops may enhance hatch security

Pirates have been known to gain access through portholes and windows. The fitting of steel bars to windows will prevent this even if they manage to shatter the window

Prior to entering the High Risk Area procedures for controlling access to accommodation, machinery spaces and store rooms should be set out and practised.

Physical Barriers

Pirates typically use long lightweight hooked ladders, grappling hooks with rope attached and long hooked poles with a climbing rope attached to board vessels underway. Physical barriers should be used to make it as difficult as possible to gain

access to vessels by increasing the height and difficulty of any climb for an attacking pirate.

Razor Wire

Razor wire (also known as barbed tape) creates an effective barrier but only when carefully deployed. The barbs on the wire are designed to have a piercing and gripping action. Care should be taken when selecting appropriate razor wire as the quality (wire gauge and frequency of barbs) and type will vary considerably. Lower quality razor wire is unlikely to be effective. Three main types of razor wire are commonly available:

1) Unclipped (straight strand)

2) Spiral (like a telephone cord)

3) Concertina (linked spirals)

Concertina razor wire is recommended as the linked spirals make it the most effective barrier. Razor wire should be constructed of high tensile wire, which is difficult to cut with hand tools. Concertina razor wire coil diameters of approximately 730 mm or 980 mm are recommended. When deploying razor wire personal protective equipment to protect hands, arms and faces must be used. Moving razor wire using wire hooks (like meat hooks) rather than by gloved hand reduces the risk of injury. It is recommended that razor wire is provided in shorter sections (e.g. 10 meter section) as it is significantly easier and safer to use than larger sections which can be very heavy and unwieldy. A robust razor wire barrier is particularly effective if it is:

Constructed outboard of the ship's structure (i.e. overhanging) to make it more difficult for pirates to hook on their boarding ladder/grappling hooks to the ship's structure. τ Constructed of a double roll of concertina wire - some vessels use a treble roll of concertina razor wire which is even more effective.Properly secured to the vessel to prevent pirates pulling off the razor wire, with for example the hook of a boarding ladder. Consideration should also be given to further securing the razor wire with a wire strop through the razor wire to prevent it being dislodged

Electrified barriers are not recommended for hydrocarbon carrying vessels but, following a full risk assessment, can be appropriate and effective for some other types of vessel. It is recommended that warning signs of the electrified fence or barrier are displayed - inward facing in English/language of the crew, outward facing in Somali. The use of such outward facing warning signs might also be considered as a deterrent even if no part of the barrier is actually electrified

Water Spray and Foam Monitors

The use of water spray and/or foam monitors has been found to be effective in deterring or delaying pirates attempting to board a vessel. The use of water can make it difficult for a pirate skiff to remain alongside and makes it significantly more difficult for a pirate to try to climb onboard. Options include: Fire hoses and foam monitors – Manual operation of hoses and foam monitors is not recommended as this is likely to place the operator in a particularly exposed position and therefore it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors (delivering water) should be fixed in position to cover likely pirate access routes. Improved water coverage may be achieved by using fire hoses in jet mode but by utilising baffle plates fixed a short

distance in front of the nozzle.

Water cannons – These are designed to deliver water in a vertical sweeping arc thus protecting a greater part of the hull. Many of these have been developed from tank cleaning machines.

Ballast pumps – Where possible to do so ships may utilise their ballast pumps to flood the deck with water thus providing a highly effective water curtain over the ship's side. This may be achieved by allowing ballast tanks to over-flow on to the deck, by using existing pipework when in ballast condition, or by retrofitting pipework to allow flooding of the decks whilst in loaded condition. Care must be taken to ensure that ballast tanks are not over-pressurised causing damage to the hull and tanks, or vessel stability compromised. If in doubt it is recommended that the relevant Classification Society be contacted for advice.

Steam – Hot water, or using a diffuser nozzle to produce steam has also been found to be very effective in deterring attacks

Water spray rails - Some ships have installed spray rails using a Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) water main, with spray nozzles to produce a water curtain to cover larger areas

Foam can be used, but it must be in addition to a vessel's standard Fire Fighting Equipment (FFE) stock. Foam is effective as it is disorientating and very slippery

making it difficult to climb through

The following points are also worthy of note: Once rigged and fixed in position it is recommended that hoses and foam monitors are in a ready state, requiring just the remote activation of fire pumps to commence delivery of water. Where possible no maintenance should be carried out on the vessel's sea water systems whilst on passage in the High Risk Area. Note that in order to utilise all pumps additional power may be required and therefore these systems should also be ready for immediate use. Practice, observation, and drills will be required in order to ensure that the results achieved by the equipment, provide effective coverage of vulnerable areas.

Alarms

Sounding the ship's alarms/whistle serves to inform the vessel's crew that a piracy attack has commenced and, importantly, demonstrates to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it. If approached, continuous sounding of the vessel's foghorn/whistle distracts the pirates and as above lets them know that they have been seen. It is important to ensure that:

1) The piracy alarm is distinctive to avoid confusion with other alarms, potentially leading to the crew mustering at the wrong location outside the accommodation

2) Crew members are familiar with each alarm, including the signal warning of an attack and an all clear, and the appropriate response to it.

3) Exercises are carried out prior to entering the High Risk Area.

Manoeuvring Practice

Practising manoeuvring the vessel prior to entry into the High Risk Area will be very beneficial and will ensure familiarity with the ship's handling characteristics and how to effect anti-piracy manoeuvres whilst maintaining the best possible speed. (Waiting until the ship is attacked before practising this is too late!

Where navigationally safe to do so, Masters are encouraged to practise manoeuvring their ships to establish which series of helm orders produce the most difficult sea conditions for pirate skiffs trying to attack, without causing a significant reduction in the ship's speed.

Deny Use of Ship's Tools and Equipment

Pirates generally board vessels with little in the way of equipment other than personal weaponry. It is important to try to deny pirates the use of ship's tools or equipment that may be used to gain entry into the vessel. Tools and equipment that maybe of use to the pirates should be stored in a secure location

Safe Muster Points / Citadels

Any decision to navigate in waters where the vessel's security may be threatened requires careful consideration and detailed planning to ensure the safety of the crew and vessel. Consideration should be given to establishing a Safe Muster Point or secure Citadel and an explanation of each follows:

Safe Muster Point:

A Safe Muster Point is a designated area chosen to provide maximum physical protection to the crew, preferably low down within the vessel.

In the event of a suspicious approach, members of the crew not required on the Bridge or the Engine Room Control Room will muster.

A Safe Muster Point is a short-term safe haven, which will provide ballistic protection should the pirates commence firing with small arms weaponry or RPGs.

Citadels:

If Citadels are to be employed, they should be complementary to, rather than a replacement for, all other Ship Protection Measures set out in BMP4. The establishing of a Citadel may be beyond the capability of ship's staff alone, and may well require external technical advice and support. A Citadel is a designated pre-planned area purpose built into the ship where, in the event of imminent boarding by pirates, all crew will seek protection. A Citadel is designed and constructed to resist a determined pirate trying to gain entry for a fixed period of time. The details of the construction and operation of Citadels are beyond the scope of this booklet. A detailed document containing guidance and advice is included on the MSCHOA and NATO Shipping Centre website. The whole concept of the Citadel approach is lost if any crew member is left outside before it is secured. Ship operators and Masters are strongly advised to check the MSCHOA website for detailed up to date advice and guidance regarding the construction and operation of Citadels including the criteria that Naval/Military forces will apply before considering a boarding operation to release the crew from the Citadel.

Citadel secured Entrance

It is important to note that Naval/Military forces will apply the following criteria before a boarding to release those in a Citadel can be considered:

100% of the crew must be secured in the Citadel. The crew of the ship must have self contained, independent, reliable 2-way external communications (sole reliance on VHF communications is not sufficient). The pirates must be denied access to ship propulsion. The use of a Citadel, even where the above criteria are applied, cannot guarantee a Naval/Military response.

Unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors

The use of unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors is a matter for individual ship operators following their own voyage risk assessment. The deployment onboard is subject to the national laws of the Flag State. The use of experienced and competent unarmed Private Maritime Security Contractors can be a valuable addition to BMP

Unarmed Security

Armed Private Maritime Security Contractors

The use, or not, of armed Private Maritime Security Contractors onboard merchant vessels is a matter for individual ship operators to decide following their own voyage risk assessment and approval of respective Flag States. This advice does not constitute a recommendation or an endorsement of the general use of armed Private Maritime Security Contractors. Subject to risk analysis, careful planning and agreements the provision of Military Vessel Protection Detachments (VPDs) deployed to protect vulnerable shipping is the recommended option when considering armed guard

If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are to be used they must be as an additional layer of protection and not as an alternative to BMP. If armed Private Maritime Security Contractors are present on board a merchant vessel, this fact should be included in reports to UKMTO and MSCHOA. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) have produced guidance in the form of IMO Circulars for ship operators and Masters and for Flag States on the use of Private Maritime Security Contractors on board ships in the High Risk Area.

Armed Security guards Protecting the port side of the vessel

Section 6

6.1 Approach Stage

If the crew of a vessel suspects that it is coming under a pirate attack there are specific actions that are recommended to be taken during the approach stage and the attack stage. It should be noted that the pirates generally do not use weapons until they are within two cables of a vessel, therefore any period up until this stage can be considered as 'approach', and gives a vessel valuable time in which to activate her defences and make it clear to pirates that they have been seen and the vessel is prepared and will resist.

If not already at full speed, increase to maximum to open the CPA. Try to steer a straight course to maintain a maximum speed. Initiate the ship's pre-prepared emergency procedures. Activate the Emergency Communication Plan τ Sound the emergency alarm and make a 'Pirate Attack' announcement in accordance with the Ship's Emergency Plan. to Report the attack immediately to UKMTO (+971 505 523 215). UKMTO is the primary point of contact during an attack but MSCHOA acts as a back-up contact point. Once established, maintain communication with UKMTO. Please report attack to UKMTO even if part of a national convoy so other merchant ships can be warned. τ Activate the Ship Security Alert System (SSAS), which will alert your Company Security Officer and Flag State. Make a 'Mayday' call on VHF Ch. 16 (and backup Ch. 08, which is monitored by naval units). τ Send a distress message via the Digital Selective Calling system (DSC) and Inmarsat-C, as applicable.

Pirates aprroaching the port side of a ship

Ensure that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) is switched ON. All crew, except those required on the bridge or in the engine room, should muster at the Safe Muster Point or Citadel if constructed, so that the crew are given as much ballistic protection as possible should the pirates get close enough to use weapons. Where possible, alter course away from the approaching skiffs and/or Motherships. When sea

conditions allow, consider altering course to increase an approaching skiff's exposure to wind/waves.

 Activate water spray and other appropriate self-defensive measures. Ensure that all external doors and, where possible, internal public rooms and cabins, are fully secured. In addition to the emergency alarms and announcements for the benefit of the vessel's crew sound the ship's whistle/ foghorn continuously to demonstrate to any potential attacker that the ship is aware of the attack and is reacting to it.

Attack stage

Reconfirm that all ship's personnel are in a position of safety. As the pirates close in on the vessel, Masters should commence small alterations of helm whilst maintaining speed to deter skiffs from lying alongside the vessel in preparation for a boarding attempt. These manoeuvres will create additional wash to impede the operation of the skiffs. Substantial amounts of helm are not recommended, as these are likely to significantly reduce a vessel's speed

Pirates take Control

1) Try to remain calm.

2) Before the pirates gain access to the bridge, inform UKMTO. Ensure that the SSAS has been activated, and ensure that the AIS is switched on.

3) Offer no resistance to the pirates once they reach the bridge. Once on the bridge the pirates are likely to be aggressive, highly agitated, and possibly under the influence of drugs (including khat, an amphetamine like stimulant), so remaining calm and cooperating fully will greatly reduce the risk of harm.

4) If the bridge/engine room is to be evacuated the main engine should be stopped and all way taken off the vessel if possible (and if navigationally safe to do so). All remaining crew members should proceed to the designated Safe Muster Point with their hands visible.

5) Leave any CCTV running.

Pirates on Board

6.2 In the Event of Military Action

In the event that Naval/Military forces take action onboard the ship, all personnel should keep low to the deck and cover their head with both hands, with hands visible. On no account should personnel make movements which could be misinterpreted as being aggressive

Military Action on a tanker

Do not use flash photography.

Be prepared to be challenged on your identity. Brief and prepare ship's personnel to expect this and to cooperate fully during any Naval/Military action onboard

Be aware that English is not the working language of all Naval/ Military forces in the region. Naval/Military forces will endeavour to respond rapidly to ongoing acts of piracy. However because of the very large distances across the High Risk Area a Naval/Military response may not be possible.

Section 7

7.1 Piracy Definition

According to article 101 of UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) Piracy Definition is :

(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:

(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State;

(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;

 (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).

According to BMP a pirate may include actions such as the following:

a) The use of violence against the ship or its personnel, or any attempt to use violence

b) Attempt(s) to board the vessel where the Master suspects the persons are pirates

c) An actual boarding whether successful in gaining control of the vessel or not

d) Attempts to overcome the Ship Protection Measures by the use of: ladders, grappling hooks, Weapons deliberately used against or at the vessel.

Definitions of Piracy Activities

Pirate Attack

A piracy attack as opposed to an approach is where a vessel has been subjected to an aggressive approach by a pirate craft AND weapons have been discharged

Hijack

A hijack is where pirates have boarded and taken control of a vessel against the crew's will.

Illegal Boarding

An illegal boarding is where pirates have boarded a vessel but HAVE NOT taken control. Command remains with the Master. The most obvious example of this is the Citadel scenario.

Suspicious or Aggressive Approach

Action taken by another craft may be deemed suspicious if any of the following occur (the list is not exhaustive):

a) A definite course alteration towards the craft associated with a rapid increase in speed, by the suspected craft, that cannot be accounted for as normal activity in the circumstances prevailing in the area.

b) Small craft sailing on the same course and speed for an uncommon period and distance, not in keeping with normal fishing or other circumstances prevailing in the area

c) Sudden changes in course towards the vessel and aggressive behaviour

In helping to evaluate suspicious activity, the following may be of assistance to determine the nature of a suspect vessel

1. The number of crew on board relative to its size.

2. The Closest Point of Approach (CPA)

 3. The existence of unusual and non-fishing equipment, e.g. ladders, climbing hooks or large amounts of fuel onboard.

4. If the craft is armed in excess of the level commonly experienced in the area.

5. If weapons are fired in the air.

7.2 Piracy Statistics

There have been 124 armed robberies, hijackings and other attacks on ships by Southeast Asia sea criminals in 2015 through Sept. 7, according to data from the International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime Bureau. Since 2010, attacks on ships in regional waters have more than doubled on a yearly basis, and in 2014 they accounted for nearly six of every 10 sea crimes world-wide, the group said.

Piracy attacks 2009-2015
Piracy globally is off its peak, but has jumped in Southeast Asia

- Central America, Caribbean and South America
- East Africa and Indian Ocean
- Southeast Asia and Indian Subcontinent
- West Africa
- Other areas

Year	Total
2009	535
2010	688
2011	679
2012	372
2013	361
2014	403
2015*	306

*As of Sept. 11, 2015   Source: Bergen Risk Solutions

Number of seafarers subject to piracy attacks
3,654 seafarers were faced with pirates in Southeast Asia in 2014

Southeast Asia 3,654

Gulf of Guinea 1,035

320 Indian Ocean

Source: Oceans Beyond Piracy

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